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0. Introduction 
It is the purpose of this paper to show that certain results 
(derived from rational expectations monetary models where real 
balance services enter the utility function directly) -- such as 
(1) an increase in the mean of the rate of growth of the money 
supply induces a welfare loss and (2) an increase in the variance
of the rate of growth of the money supply may cause an increase 
in welfare -- are not dependent upon the Friedman-Patinkin-
Samuelson device of inserting real balances into the utility 
function. 
We thank David Cass, Robert Lucas , Don Roper , Charles Wilson , Edward 
Sieper, the Economics Seminar at the University of California , 
Berkeley, and the participants of the Australian National University 
Economics Seminar , and the participants at the 1977 MSSB Conference 
at Dartmouth , New Hampshire , for extremely useful comments on this 
work . This research was supported by NSF Grant 74-19692. None
of the above are responsible for errors or shortcomings contained 
herein. 
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More specifically we set up an overlapping generations model 
where money balances are the only way of carrying wealth from 
periods of high endowment to periods of low endowment . Our 
setup is like that of Samuelson [17] , Cass-Yaari [7] , Gale [10], 
Lucas [12] and Cass-Okuno-Zilcha [6] . In particular we use 
the Cass-Okuno-Zilcha discussion of rational expectations 
equilibria with a positive price of money and the Gale 
analysis of Gale's "Samuelson" case . However , no one except 
Lucas [12] has addressed himself to the question of whether an 
increase in the mean rate of growth in the money supply would 
cause a welfare loss in an overlapping generations model . How-
ever in Lucas [12] monetary transfers during,. the period were 
proportional to the individual's beginning of period balances . 
Hence Lucas's agents suffered no capital losses on money due to 
inflation . Furthermore , although Ben Eden [9] studied the case 
of random money supply and obtained the result that an increase 
in the variance of the rate of growth of money could increase 
equilibrium welfare , no one has studied such a question in a 
model without real balances in the utility function . We take up 
both issues here . 
Section 1 sets up the model and studies rational expectations
equilibria when the money supply grows at a constant nonrandom 
rate a. It is shown that an increase in the rate of growth of
the money supply leads to welfare loss . Other properties of 
equilibria are explored as well . 
In Section 2 uncertainty in the rate of growth of the money 
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supply is introduced . It is shown that if there is no uncertainty 
in tastes and endowments then there is an equivalent deterministic 
monetary policy in the sense that the same stationary real balance 
equilibrium is generated by that policy as was generated by the 
random policy . 
Section 3 contains a study of equilibria when real balances 
converge to 0 as t-l-00 and a discussion of the economic meaning of 
such equilibria . 
Section 4 contains a summary and conclusion. 
Before we begin we want to acknowledge that we have borrowed 
ideas from Cass and Shell's notes [5], Okuno-Zilcha [16], and 
Wallace [19]. 
Finally, we would like to acknowledge the intellectual 
influence of F. Black [l] upon us in stressing the importance of 
the nonuniqueness problem discussed in Section 3 for monetary 
policy. Calvo [3 and 4] has written two interesting papers on 
related topics . 
1 .  The Model 
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The model presented here is a simple overlapping generations 
model. Each consumer lives two periods . There is no population 
growth and there is only one consumption good . A consumer born in 
period t is called "young" at t and "old" at t + 1 .  In period t he 
receives an endowment w and in period t + 1 he receives w < w .y 0 y 
Furthermore in period t + 1 he receives a monetary transfer ht+l"
The consumption good is perishable but the consumer may carry money 
from t to t +  1. His utility function is given by u (c (t) )  + ou (c (t) ) .y 0 
Formally each consumer solves 
(P) 
subject to 
Maximize u(c (t)) + 6u(c (t+l))y 0 
p c (t) + m·(t) • p w t y y t y
Pt+l c0 (t+l) • my(t) + ht+l + Pt+lwo
where c (t) is consumption of a young person at t, c (t + 1) isy 0 
consumption of an old person at t + 1, and m (t) is money demand y 
by young at t .  If u is strongly concave (i . e . ,  u" (x) < O) and 
u' (O) = + oo, a sufficient condition for a solution to (P) is 
given by 
(1.1) 
and 
u' (c (t})y 
u' cc::-c1:+rr> 0 
c < w • y y
pt 6 Pt+l 
Now we are ready to define a monetary equilibrium for a money 
supply sequconce 
s 00 {mt
}
t=O" 
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Definition : A sequence {p }00 0 , p > 0 ,  t t t= t 0 ,1  . . •  is a monetary 
equilibrium if 
a) for all t, c (t) + c (t) = w + w 
---����o�- o y 
s b) mt m (t) ,  t=0,1, 2, . . • y 
w 
Note that (b) is just the requirement that money supply be 
equal to money demand in every period since old people demand no 
money . We are now ready to prove an easy but basic result for 
the case of certainty . 
Propo sition 1. If h =m
s 
t t 
s
mt-1 - amt
s 
1.a > -1, and if c and c are- y 0 
OU I (C )positive number s such that u'(c ) • .o , c + c = w Y l + a Y 0 
s and if 0 < c - w , then Pt+l : (1 + a)pt, p : m /(c -w )0 0 0 0 0 0 
forms an equilibrium sequence. 
Proof: We will show that {pt}
"' 
1, and c (t) : c , t = 0, 1. .. , c (t) : c , t• y y 0 0 
t•O, 1. .. satisfy (1.1) and the defi nition of a monetary equilibrium. On 
the one hand it is obvious from the definition of {p } that (1.1) is t 
satisfied . 
On the other hand we must show that market clearing obtains . It is 
enough to show that the money market clears .  Now 
m (0) = p (w - c ) = p (c - w )y 0 y y 0 0 0 
s m .0 
Hence (b) holds for t O. Suppose now that (b) holds for t �
Then since 
po 
sm 0 ·' 
(
co_ wo) 
T-1 . 
therefore 
ms (l + a) T m
s
p = o _ T T = 
(co - wo) (co - wo) 
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From the budget constraint of the consumer when he's young and 
the construction of {pt} we have 
m (T) y p (w - c ) T y y p (c - w ) T o o 
s m .T 
This ends the proof . Before going on we warn the reader that has 
not looked at Gale [10], Cass-Okuno-Zilcha [6], and Wallace [20] 
that there are a continuium of perfect forsight equilibria. The 
stationary equilibrium of Proposition 1 is just one of these . We
defer study of the others until Section 3 .  
It may be helpful to develop a graphical depiction of 
equilibria before doing any more analysis . For the case 
ht = 0, ·t = 1,2, • • •  follow the Cas
s-Okuno-Zilcha (COZ) paper [6] 
and recognize that the solution (c (t) , c  (t + 1)) of the consumer'sy 0 
problem lies on his offer curve . Then depict the dynamics of a 
perfect foresight equilibrium as do COZ.1 Unfortunately this neat
depiction of the equilibrium dynamics is not as useful when 
ht f 0 since the offer curve at each date depends upon {ht} .
We can, however, depict the stationary a-equilibria graphically . 
Given a utility function U (c ,c ) consider the income y 0 
consumption 
curve, call it ICC (a) , generated by the problem, 
Maximize U (c ,c ) y 0 
as I varies . 
s . t. c + (1 + a) c y 0 
I, 
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Stationary a-equilibria are contained in the set of points E (a) 
where ICC (a) intersects the economy's production possibility 
frontier 
PPF { (c , c ) j c + c 
y 0 y 0 
w + w = w}.
y 0 
A point (c (a) , c (a) )  E E (a) is indeed a a-equilibrium if 
y 0 
positive real balances are carried at (c (a) , � (a) ) . In order to y 0 
check for positive real balances just check that the elderly are 
spending more than w0 or what is the same thing the young are
spending less than w • Graphically speaking points in E (a) thaty 
lie to the left of (w ,w ) on the PPF are a-equilibria. y 0 
Such a graphical apparatus may be used with profit in 
constructing examples. We shall rely on COZ to aid us in briefly 
expositing some examples. 
The first example is one where the barter equilibrium is 
Pareto Optimal but a < 0 may be chosen so that the resulting 
stationary monetary equilibrium is Pareto Optimal. This shows 
that the "Existence Proposition" (as COZ call it) in Samuelson's 
basic model does not obtain when a f 0. To construct the example 
set (w , w  ) ::: (c ,c ) and follow Proposition 2 (b) below. In y 0 y 0 
other words choose a < 0 and check that ICC (a) cuts the PPF left 
of (2 ,2 ) in the normal case. Show this by noting that ICC (O)y 0 
cuts PPF exactly at (2 ,2 ) and by noticing that c is cheaper
y 0 0 
than c when a < O. y 
The first example is what COZ call a "coexistence example." 
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We did not need heterogeneity of tastes as did COZ, but we did 
need a 1 0 in order to create such an example.
Turn now to a second example. 
In order to create what COZ call a "nonoptimality example" 
choose (w , w  ) so that it is not Pareto optimal. Anywhere to the 
y 0 
right of (2 ,c ) on the PPF will do. Now choose a >  0 so that y 0 
ICC (a) cuts PPF to the right of (2 ,2 ) but to the left of y 0 
(w , w  ) .  By Proposition 2 (a) such a a-equilibrium is not Pareto y 0 
optimal. 
It is important to recognize that in the COZ examples a = O. 
The counterexamples that they present are more fundamental in the 
sense that government is not doing anything to distort the terms 
of trade between present and future in their examples . 
We feel, however, that the case a 1 0 drives home the point
that the mere act itself of introducing a social mechanism such 
as money that allows finitely lived people in a world of perishable 
goods to store value has little to do with efficiency � se even
when preferences are very well behaved. Take note that we are not 
saying that there is no way that government can manage the money 
supply that will improve efficiency. COZ do not tell us that 
there is no way to steer their nonoptimality example to a Pareto 
Optimum by a well chosen monetary policy. It would be interesting 
to ask : What conditions on preferences and endowments guarantee 
the existence of � monetary policy that will lead to a Pareto
Optimum equilibrium? Let us get back to analysis. 
Now for fixed o, what happens when a varies?
-----. 
Since U (c , c  ) y y 0 _l U (c , c ) (1 + a) o Y o 
c + c = w y 0 
c + (1 + a ) c = I y 0 
hence, for the case U (c , c ) = u (c) + ou (c ) , we havey 0 y 0 
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� - ru"<c ) aa -l Y 
- �-1 -+au"(w - c. ). cSu'(w - cy) (1 + a)2 > 0 
1 
hence, ac _J_ > o.ac 
1 +a 
But notice that this is valid only for c < w . (By Proposition 1 y y 
the requirement that cy < wy is needed for equilibrium, vis . c0 > w0, 
obtains. ) Thus a higher rate of monetary expansion induces a higher 
consumption when young. 
What can be said about Pareto Optimality? We can prove : 
Proposition 2: (a) For a > 0, if a time stationary equilibrium exists, 
Proof: 
anC:
then it is Pareto Inefficient. 
(b) For a � 0, if a time stationary equilibrium exists, 
it is Pareto Optimum. 
We take up part (a) first. 
2 + c y 0 w, 
u' (e). &l'(c ).y 0 
Let c , c be defined by y 0 
Call (2 ,2 ) the "global Pareto Optimum . "y 0 
Then, if c (a) and c (a) denote the consumption bundles in the 0 y 
competitive equilibrium associated with a I 0 we know that
c (a) > 2 and c (a) < 2 . We show that the allocation (2 ,2 ) y y 0 0 0 y 
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Pareto dominates (c (cr),c (a)). C learly the old consumer at time0 y 
zero is better off . Also 
u (2 ) + ou (c ) > u (c (a)) + ou(c (a)) y 0 y 0 
since, 2 ,2 is the unique solution to the problem : y 0 
subject to 
Maximize u (c ) + Ou (c ) y 0 
c + c y 0 w 
and c (cr),c (a) satisfy c (a) + c (a) = w. 
y 0 y 0 
This ends the proof of part (a) .  Turn now to the proof of part 
(b) . 
(b) Now consider the case a � 0 .  The proof is by
contradiction . Suppose we may make some individual better off 
without making anyone else worse off. Then we must give him more 
in his old age . This is so, because if we give him more in his 
youth we must take it away from the old one who is still alive . 
Hence we may suppose without loss of generality that it is the 
first person·that is made better off by the proposed reallocation. 
Hence there exists a feasible allocation {c (t), c (t)}
'"' 
0 y 0 t'" 
with 
u(c (t)) + ISu(c (t + 1)) > u(c (a)) +cu(� (a)) for t = 0,1,2 • • • y 0 .. y 0 
and 
c (0) > c (a).0 0 
Now since u is strictly concave, 
u (c (O) )  - u (c (a)) < u' (c (cr ) ) (c (O) y y y y c (a))y 
u' (c (cr ) ) (c (a) - c (0) ) .y 0 0 
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Now since the proposed reallocation Pareto dominates (c (a),c (a)),y 0 
u is concave, and c (0) + c (O) � w we must havey 0 
ou (c (1)) - ou(c (a)) � u (c (a)) - u (c (O) )0 0 y y 
> u' (c (cr ) ) (c (a) - c (0) )y y y 
u' (c (cr ) ) (c (O) - c (a)).y 0 0 
The chain of inequalities derived above give us 
(2) ou (c (1) )  - ou (c (a)) > u' (c (cr ) ) (c (O) - c (a)) > 0 .0 0 y 0 0 
Again, the concavity of u gives us 
(3) ou (c (1)) - ou (c (a)) � ou' (c-{cr ) ) (c (1) - c (a)).0 0 0 0 0 
From (2) and (3) together we get
c (1) - c (a) u' (c (a))0 0 >--�-
co (O) - c0 (cr ) ou' (c0 (cr ) )
1 
(1 + a)
If a < 0, then replacing "O" by "l" and "l" by "2" in the above 
reasoning continuing in the above manner we eventually obtain 
- 1 t - - -c (t) - c (a) > (-1--) (c (0) - c (a)) > w - c (a).o o +a o o o 
for t large enough which is a contradiction to c0 (t) � w .
For the case a 0, it may be possible that
t� (c0 (t) - c0 (0) )  = y < w 
In such a case we must have 
i�(c (o) - c (t) )E y y 
But note that c (o) = c ,c (o) = c y y 0 0 
y. 
c (a).0 
The strong concavity of u guarantees us that for a t sufficiently 
large, 
u(cy(t)) + ou(co(t)) < u(cy) + ou(co) 
since a1,c0 solve 
maximize u(cy) + ou(co) 
subject to Cy + CQ • W • 
This is a contradiction to the hypothesis that {c (t) ,c {t) } y 0 
Pareto dominates (c ,c ) . 
y 0 
Q. E. D. 
Notice that our results concerning Pareto-Optimality differ 
from those of Lucas [12]. The reason is that Lucas assumed that
transfers were proportional to the money holdings of the consumer . 
In our model transfers are given exogenously, and hence for higher 
rates of expansion of the money supply the individual tries to 
economize in real money balances, and hence consumes more in his 
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young age. More to the point a � 0 imposes a wedge between the
marginal rate of substitution and the "marginal rate of transfer-
mation" which is unity along the PPF. 
Existence of a stationary equilibrium with a positive price 
for money requires that the MRS evaluated at the initial endow-
ment point be less than 1 When w0 > 0 if the factor of 1 +a 
monetary expansion, l·+ a, becomes "too large" there will exist no
pair c , c0 with u' (c )y y 
ou' (c0)
1 + a
cy + c0
= w and c0 > w0• Hence
in such a case no stationary monetary equilibrium will exist. We 
can, however, prove the following result : 
Proposition 3 :  For a given w suppose w > 2 and consequently y y 
w < 2 0 0 Then there exists E > 0 such that for each a� E ,
there exists p0 (cr) such that the sequence pt (cr) with
Pt+l (a) = (1 + cr)pt (cr), t 0, 1, . . .  form an equilibrium.
Proof : ou' (w )By assumption u' (w )  < ou' (w )  and hence, u' (w )  < o Y 0 Y (1 + a)
for any a < E for some E > O. 
Consequently we may find c (a) and c (a) such that c (a) + c (a)y 0 y 0 
ou' (c (a)) . and u' (c (a)) = · o with c (a) > w and hence c (a) < w .Y (1 + a) Y Y o o 
The result follows from Proposition 1. 
The reader should notice that when the rate of deflation is 
high enough every generation but the zero-th one is made worse off 
than at his initial endowment. It may seem strange that the 
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w 
�---- - - , 
introduction of money makes one enter in transactions that lower 
his utility. One should not forget however than in a deflation 
ht < O. Hence the deflation is equivalent to a tax on old people
(except, of course, the first generation of old people). 
If one would consider a model as the one considered here but 
with t ranging from -00 to 00, then it is obvious that a = 0 would 
yield the unique Pareto-Optimum stationary equilibrium . This is 
because in such a case there will be no zero-th generation being 
made better off by the increase in the real value of their money 
holdings caused by the expected deflation. Turn now to the case 
of uncertainty. 
2 .  The Money Supply Is Random 
The purpose of this section is to formulate a notion of 
rational expectations equilibrium in the overlapping generations 
setup introduced in Section 1 for. the case when the money supply 
is random. 
After doing this we will demonstrate for a given variance 
of the rate of growth of the money supply there is a deterministic 
growth rate that gives the same real allocation in equilibrium. 
This follows from observing that the price level is proportional 
to the quantity of money in a stationary rational expectations 
equilibrium. Hence it turns out that when the variance of the 
money supply increases the variance of the price level increases 
and this in turn may increase the average real rate of return on 
cash over any interval of time due to the convexity of the 
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function f(p) = 1. Given that money provides the only means of 
p 
carrying wealth forward from youth to old age in this model it 
seems plausible that people will be made better off if the 
average real rate of return on this asset is increased. Let us 
get into the details. 
The real side of the model is the same as that in Section 
1. The only difference is that given m� at each t + 1 the 
transfer is given by 
(2 .1) h t+l - (l\. - l)m
s 
t -
--S amt 
where A is a random variable. For example, we will put 
(2.2) A. {A +  A, probability 1/2} A - A, probability 1/2 
where A is constant and study what happens to equilibrium values 
when A increases. 
At each time t the young solve 
(P) 
subject to 
(2.3) 
(2 .4)
maximize u(c (t)) + oE u(c (t + 1)) y t 0 
p c (t) + m (t) = ptw t y y y 
p le (t + 1) = m (t) + h 1 + p lw t+ 0 y t+ t+ 0 
m (t) + (l\. - l)ms + p 1w . y t t+ 0 
Here Et denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on 
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information available at t. Also variables with tildes are 
random. 
(2.5) 
The old consume at t according to: 
ptco(t) m Ct - 1) + n + Ii w y t t 0 
We may now define a rational expectations equilibrium. 
Definition: Rational expectations equilibrium (R.E.). 
(2. 6) 
(2.7) 
{-s}oo Let the random process mt t=O be given. A sequence of 
random variables {p0,p1,p2, ... } is an R.E. if money 
demand equals money supply and goods demand equals 
{-s}oo goods supply for almost every realization of m 0. t t= 
I.e., for almost all realizations of {m }00 0 h t t= we ave 
(a) 
(b) 
c (t) + c (t) y 0 
-S mt m (t),t y 
w + w 0 y 
0,1,2, ... 
w,t 0,1,2, ... 
The definition just says that people know the probability 
distribution of the money supply process, the price level process, 
and that their expectations are confirmed. 
Time zero is special since we must specify the initial stock 
of money as the holdings of the old that are living at time 0. 
I.e., 
(2.8) s m 0 m (O), 0 
---------. 
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and 
(2.9) p c (0) = m (O) + p w • ms + p w • 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0
Hence, as in the certainty case, we are assuming that 
(2.10) p = m5/(c (0)-w ). 0 0 0 0 
As in the certainty case we will choose c (O) and define p via (2.9) in 0 0 
order to create an equilibrium candidate that is stationary in the real 
variables. 
In order to solve for an R.E. let us derive the first order necessary 
conditions for an optimum of (P) given {pt From (2.3) and (2.4) we get 
(2.11) u(c (t)) + oEtu(c (t+l)) y 0 
= u[w - m (t)/pt] + cE u[(m (t) +(A - l)m
s
)/p +l + w ] . y y t y t t  0 
Differentiate both sides of (2 .11) w. r. t. iii ( t) to get y 
(2 .12) -u'(c (t))(l/p) + oEt{u' (c (t+l))(l/fi +l)} < 0 (=O , if m (t)�O). y t 0 t = y 
Now in an R.E. it is necessary that 
(2 .13) fu� .. m
y
(t), t =O, 1, 2, ... 
ms :m (O) . 0 0 
Put (2.12) in real balance form and use (2.13) to get 
(2.14) -u' (c
y
(t)) xt + oEt{u'(c0(t+l) )(my
(t)/pt+l)} 
= -u'(c (t)) xt + oEt{u'(c (t+l))(m (t+l)/p +l)(fu (t)/m (t+l)} y 0 y t y y 
a -u'(c
y
(t)) xt + oEt{u1(�0(t+l))(Xt+l)(fus(t)/ms(t+l)} � 0. 
Here 
(2 .15) xt = m Ct)/fi • y t 
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In order to find a solution to the R.E. equations we will try for 
an. R.E. of the form 
(2 .16) c (t) = c , c (t) = c . 0 0 y y xt z x > o, fi - m Ct)/x t s 
where all barred quantities are constant and nonrandom. 
From (2.14) and (2.16) if i > O, we must have 
(2.17) 
But 
(2.18) 
-u'(c) + ou'(c) Et{m (t)/m (t+l)} = 0. y 0 s s 
Et{ms(t)/ms(t+l)} = Et{l/A} = 1/2{1/(A+A) + l/(A-A)}. 
Notice that R.H.S. (2.18) increases as A increases for 0 � A < A.
Let 
(2 .19) R : Et {l/A}. 
Can we find (c ,c ) such that 
y 0 
(2.20) 
(2. 21) 
u'(cy) D cR u'(co), 
c +c =wEw + w
y 0 y 0 
Examine the following diagram: 
c 0
w 
c 0
0 c y w 
FIGURE 1
u = u Cc ) + oRu Cc ) y 0 
c 
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y 
O'b.viously the point of tangency in Figure 1 solves (2.20) and (2.21).
Now define p 0 by 
(2.22)
i.e. 
(2. 23)
Define i by 
(2.24)
l!.ut 
(2 .25) 
p c • ms + p w 0 0 0 0 0 
p .. ms /(c -w ) 0 0 0 0 
m6/p • i = c - w • 0 0 0 0 
i\ • m�/i, ii2 • m�/i, 
We may sum up the above into 
Theorem 2.1 If (2.20), (2.21) have a solution c > 0,y 
c - w > o, then i • c - w , p � ms / (c -w ), 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
t - 1, 2, is an R.E. 
20 
c0 > O, and 
s -i\ .. m/x, 
Proof: 'lhis follows immediately by the construction of the R.E. 
Welfare Economics. 
It is interesting to explore what values of (A, i0, A) lead to a Pareto 
improvement over (A , o  , ). ). To examine this question notice that the 0 0 0 
young achieve the highest utility when (� , c ) solves y 0 
(2.26) maximize u(c ) + Ou(c )y 0 
sabject to c + c "' w = w + w • y 0 y 0 
This is so because steady state utility for people born at 0, 1, 2, • • • 
is highest for solutions of (2.26),
However the utility of old people living at t • 0 may not be the highest 
possible at c • c • 0 0 
We will show that there exist initial conditions (A0 , o0 , A0 )
such that increasing the variance of the money supply will make 
everyone better off in R.E . For let A
0 
> l, A0 = O. Then 
Let 
o R = o /A < o . 0 0 0 0 
c (A ,o , A ),c (A ,o , A ) y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
denote the solution of (2 . 20) and (2.21). 
to a value X such that 0 
1/20{ 
1 + 1 
} 
A 0 - }; A 0 0 + x 0
Now let A increase 0 
0 • 0 
Obviously the utility of the people born at 0, 1, 2, •• . is 
increased by this move since 
o 'R 0 0 0 
after the increase in A to X0 0 
What about the utility of the old people at time O? Their 
consumption rises since 
co (Ao' oo' 
A
o
) 
increases in A0 for A0 > 1, A0 0 .  Hence the elderly living at 
zero are better off as well. 
What are the economics behind this apparently paradoxical 
result? Since A0 > 1 inflation is going on at the rate A0 - 1
when A = 0. Money is the only way for the young to carry wealth
from the period of high endowment to the period of low endowment . 
Recall that w 
y > w0• But when A0 > 1, money is depreciating at the 
rate A - 1. 0 So the young consume more in their youth than is 
op�imal. For they would like to consume to maximize u (c ) + ou(c )y. 0 
subject to c + c = w. y 0
But not let A > 0. The real rate2 of return on cash balances 0 
increases due to the convexity of f (p) = l/p. Hence money 
depreciates less and the young are made better off in lifetime 
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utility terms since they save more for their old age even though 
on the average inflation is proceeding at the rate A0 - 1.
Turn to the old at time 0. Only the elderly receive fiat 
money transfers in this model . The money held by the elderly 
at time 0 is worth more to the young living at time 0 after A0
increases. Hence the young are willing to pay more in terms of 
the consumption goods to the old at time 0 in order to obtain 
their money. Hence the old at 0 are better off. 
2 2  
For what positiom Z i (A , 6 , A ) is it possi'Qle to find Z • (A, o , A)0 0 0 0 . 0 
such that everyone is better off in the R.E. (c (Z), c (Z))? The lifetimey 0 
utility of young people living at t • 0, l, 2, . • . is increased whenever 
R is made closer to unity, This is so because lifetime utility is maximized 
at the choice of (c , c ) that solves y 0 
maximize u(c ) + ou(c ) y 0 
subject to c + c y 0 
i. e. (provided that c > O, c > 0) y 0 
- w .  
(2.27) u'(c ) • 6u'(c ), c + c • w.y 0 y 0 
But in R.E. we have 
(2.28) u'(c > • oi u'(c >. c y 0 y + c 0 - w. 
Hence driving R nearer to unity leads to an increase in lifetime utility 
for young people living at t • 0, l, 2, • • •  
'What about the old living at t • O? It is easy to see that an increase 
in R leads to an increase in c 0 Totally differentiate both sidas of (2.28)
w . r . t .  R in order to prove this result. Hence� increase in 
R0 when R0 < 1 is Pareto superior . If R � 1 further increases 0
3 benefit the aged at t = 0 but harm everyone else . 
R0 may be increased by decreasing A or by increasing A. 
Hence when R0 < 1 we see that increasing the variance of the rate 
of growth of the money supply or decreasing the mean of the rate 
of growth of the money supply leads to a welfare improvement for 
everyone. 
It is worth pointing out how the graphical apparatus used to 
illuminate Propositions 1, 2 may be used to study the case of 
uncertainty. Notice that 
R = E {m (t) /m (t + l) }t s s 
plays the role of 1/ (1 + a) in Propositions 1, 2. Hence define
a by
1 
1 + iJ ::; R .
Call a the equivalent deterministic growth rate . Then look at 
the intersection of ICC (cr) and the PPF as in Section 1 .  This 
intersection is the REE studied in Section 2. Increasing the 
variance of A amounts to decreasing a so it is not surprising 
that welfare is increased if a > 0 . In fact as pointed out to 
us by Don Roper of the University of Utah it might be more 
natural to view a as measure of the mean rate of growth of the 
money supply. 
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It is natural to look for the analogue of Friedman's 
optimum quantity of money in this model for the case A = 0 .  A 
Pareto optimum is located at R0 1 :
(2.29) R0 = l/A0 = i. 
Hence constant money supply is Pareto optimum . This is the same 
as Friedman's case, since he manages the money supply so that the 
real rate of return on it is zero . His case corresponds to R0 = 1
in our model. Because people discount the utility of their 
progeny Friedman needs to contract the money supply at the rate of 
time preference in order to force the real rate of return on it to 
be zero . However, all policies A0 � 1 are Pareto optimal in our
model . The reader is referred to Brock [2] for an explicitly 
formulated version of Friedman's model. 
One should not make too much of the result that an increase 
in variance of the money supply may increase welfare . There is 
no real uncertainty in our model . I . e ., real balances are 
deterministic . The result merely says that for a given random 
rate of growth of the money supply there is an equivalent 
deterministic monetary policy that yields the same value of R .  
We are not advocating that the Fed start flipping coins in order 
to figure out what to do next . 
3. Other Equilibria 
It was Gale [10] who first showed in the nonstochastic case
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with constant money stock that besides the stationary equilibrium 
studied above there exists in general a continuum of equilibria. 
This result still persists in our model. The treatment that 
follows borrows from Gale's (10] treatment of what he calls the 
"Samuelson case," and we wish to thank Charles Wilson of the 
University of Wisconsin for pointing out to us the relevance of 
Gale's work to our problem. 
25 
Turn back to the beginning of Section 2. Let us write equation 
(2.14) in real balance form in order to study expeditiously all 
the R.E. equilibria with pt > 0, t = 0,1,2, • . .  that are not random 
in real balances, i.e., 
(3.1) -u'(w - x )x + oE {u'(w0 + x +l)(x +l
. )(m (t)/m (t + l))} � O,y t t t t t s s 
0 if xt > 0). 
Notice that we did not put a ,,-,, on xt,xt+l since we are 
restricting ourselves to the study of the selections of (3.1) 
that are nonrandom. Now 
(3.2) E {m (t)/m Ct + l)} t s s Et{l/A} = R. 
Hence (3.1) becomes 
(3.3) -u I (wy - xt)xt + oRu I (wo + xt+l)xt+l � o, ( 0 if xt > 0). 
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Let us restrict attention to those solutions of (3.3) where xt > 0, 
t = o,1,2, • • • • A sufficient condition for xt > O, t = 0,1,2, • • •  will be 
given shortly. Hence 
(3.4) u' (wy-xt)xt: A (xt) = o
Ru'(w0
+xt+l)xt+l
: B(xt+l) 
We will argue below that under reasonable assumptions on u the diagram 
below tells the story: 
A,B 
A B 
x x 
FIGURE 2 
Figure 2 is intended to capture the following basic properties: 
(a) A(O) B(O) = O; (b) B may not decrease for x > x; (c) A 
is always increasing; (d) A'(O) < B'(O); and (e) there is just 
one x > O such that A(x) = B(x), i.e., A(x) < B(x) for x£(0,�). 
If w > 0, and w > 0 then (a) obviously holds. Property y 0 
(b) will be assumed throughout. To prove (c) calculate 
(3.5) 
since 
(3.6)
A' (x) • -u"(w -x)x + u'(w - x) > O, for x > O y y 
u" � O, u' > 0, x > 0 . Turn now to (d). 
From (3.5) we obtain 
A'(O) = u'(w ), provided w > 0. 
y y 
Calculate B'(O). We have 
(3. 7) B'(x) .. t5Ru'(wo+x) + oRu"(wo+x)x ' B'(O). oRu'(wo)>O 
Hence (d) holds' provided u I (wy
) < o:Ru I (wo) 
Let us examine (e). Mere for x > 0 
(3.8) A(x) "' B(x) 
if 
(3.9) u' (wy-x) • oRu' (w0+x)
The L.H.S. of this is increasing while the R.H.S. is decreasing. 
Hence the assumption that u'(wy) < oRu'(wo) is 
sufficient for (d) 
and (e). This assumption will be maintained throughout. 
The following theorem obtains. 
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Theorem 3.1 Let the difference equation A(xt) • B(xt+l) satisfy properties 
(a)-(e); then (i) xt�o, t-+«> or (ii) xt z 
x, t c 0, 1, 2, • • •
or (iii) xt xm, t-+«> for any solution {xt} • 
Proof: 
Remark: 
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Obvious from Figure 2. Here xt�o means that the sequence xt 
decreases to O, t-+«> • Analogously xt�00 , t-+«> • 
Notice that the function B(•) is !!2.! required to be nondecreasing 
on [O, x] and that A(xt) 
• B(xt+l) may be satisfied for � 
than one xt+l for each xt. 
We have proved above that (c), (d) and (e) must hold in the class of 
models we are considering and that (a) holds when wy > 0 and w0 > O. The 
following lemma will be useful in verifying conditi9n (b). 
Lennna 3. 1: 
Proof: 
� If for y > 0, "( ) > l (i.e., the coefficient of relative u y y -
risk aversion is� 1), then B'(x) > 0 for x > 0 
:��;Y; � l implies u"(w0+x) (w0+x) + u' (w0+x) > O for any x > 0. 
Now since u"(w0+x)w0 < 0, we must have u"(w0+x)x + u' (w0+x) > 
O. 
The result follows from (3.7). Q.E.D. 
Solutions {xt} such that xt-+oo as t-+«> cannot be R.E., since from the 
budget constraint xt S..wy 
must hold. All other solutions are equilibria 
however. 
Theorem 3.2 : Let {x }00 0 be any solution of A(x ) = B (x 1) with t t= t t+ 
Proof: 
x < w for t >  0. Let � =;six , t = 0,1, 2, • . . • t- y - t t t 
Then the stochastic process {p }00 0 is an R.E. price t t= 
level sequence. 
Just check that {p } satisfies the definition of an R.E. t 
Notice that xt + 
O, t + 00 implies that people are ultimately driven to 
the consumption of their endowments. Such an equilibrium is not Pareto 
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optimal because there exists a reallocation that makes some generations 
better off while making no other generation wors e off. To construct 
such an allocation, simply wait until a time T0 when x(T0) is near 
zero and give some of the young person's endowment to the old 
living at T0. Do this for all t � T0. It is trivial to see that 
this proposed reallocation is a Pareto improvement because at T0, 
for example, the young who are harmed at T0 are given enough more 
(in their old age) by the young at T0 + 1 so that on the whole 
they are better off. 
Notice that in such a case the welfare implications of a change in 
the rate of expansion of the money supply is no longer obvious, since one 
has to know which equilibria the economy will go to. Two solutions to this 
problem are possible. One is to introduce a weaker ordering requiring only 
the existence of "better" equilibria and in this case the results of section 
3 will hold. Another is to try to get rid of the nonstationary equilibria. 
This can be accomplished either by making an alternative assumption to (a) 
or by changing the specification of the model. We first study the case 
in which the following condition holds besides (b)-(e) .. 
(a') B(O) > 0 , A(O) • 0. 
The picture is now as in Figure 3. As before, if x0 < x then 
xt+l < xt. But now B(x) > £ for all x � 0 for some £ >  0. And 
lim A(x) = 0. Hence eventually soJ.uLiom; with x0 < x cannot be x+O 
continued. Hence we have proven: 
30 
A 
B 
x x 
FIGURE 3 
Theorem 3.3: Under (a'), and (b)-(e) the stationary equilibria 
is the unique R.E. which is nonrandom in real balances. 
An obvious example in which (a') holds is given by u(y) • log y and
wy > 0, w0 • O. In this case (b) also holds, as can be verified by using 
Lemma 3. 1. Since (c),(d) and (e) ,are general properties in our 
model, Theorem 3. 3 will be true in such a case. 
We now return to the case where (a) holds instead of (a'). 
What is the economic meaning of equilibria when xt + O,t + oo, and 
should we take �uch equilibria seriously or do they just reflect 
a specification of the model that is "too loose" for sound 
economics? As the model stands it is silent about which of the 
multitude of equilibria that the economy will follow for a given 
{-s}oo money supply process mt t=O· Notice also that the price level 
grows faster than the money supply along equilibria such that 
x + Q,: t + 00 We shall, henceforth, call such �quilibria t 
hyperinflationary. 
The economic story is as follows. Suppose people expect a 
hyperinflationary path of the price level and act on such 
expectations. They will be fulfilled! Hence people by the very 
act of forming expectations on the nominal price level can have 
an impact on the evolution of real balances and drive themselves 
into a hyperinflation. Furthermore only one of the infinitude 
of equilibria is not hyperinflationary.4 
We are not sure whether to attach much economic significance 
to such equilibria for reasons that are "outside" of the model. 
For example, with an additively separable utility function if any 
change is made in the specification of the model that requires 
the holding of at least E > 0 real balances no matter how small 
E is, then only one of the equilibria remain: viz., 
xt x, t = 0, 1,2, . . . . This is so because looking at Figure 2 
we see that there will be a first time where the demand for real 
balances by the young which is greater than or equal to E will 
be smaller than the supply by the old. 
What changes in the specification of the model will lead to 
the holding of at least E > 0 worth of real balances for all t? 
A time-honored one is to require each generation while young to 
set aside E units of purchasing power which is paid out in taxes 
to the government during his youth. This money is then returned 
to the young in a lump sum at the beginning of their old age. 
This "social security" system in effect requires the young to 
carry E units of real balances. Notice that E may be chosen 
arbitrarily provided it is less than the difference between w y 
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and the consumption of the young at the stationary equilibrium. 
Hence for example in our model an arbitrarily small amount of 
social security coupled with a monetary policy that makes R = 1 
leads to a Pareto Optimum. Generating a demand for fiat money 
by requiring it to be used for payment of taxes is a common 
device in the theoretical money literature. But Edward Sieper 
of the Australian National University reminded us of Gale's 
"business cycle" which is depicted in Figure 3 b of COZ [6] . 
So a device that rules out equilibria where real balances go to 
zero is not enough to rule out equilibria that cycle for instance. 
Furthermore, after looking at COZ [6] we are convinced that one 
can construct just about any type of equilibrium you like. 
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Another device is to introduce a transactions technology into the model 
that leads to an indirect utility function that would lead to the demand 
for at least e: > 0 units of real balances in order to facilitate transactions. 
It seems reasonable to conjecture that -there exists a Becker-Lancaster 
activity analysis model of the household that would lead to the retention 
of some positive number e: > O units of real �alances for a given future 
5 bounded interval of rates of change of the price level. 
More devices of introducing a minimal demand for cash balances for 
rates of change of the price level contained in a given bounded interval 
may be generated by the imaginative economist. Notice that the 
"xt' O" equilibria depicted in Figure 2 have bounded rates of
change of the associated price level. This line of thought is 
persued in Scheinkman's [18] discussion in this volume. 
4. Some Remarks on The Meaning of All This 
In this paper we set up an overlapping generations model of 
a monetary economy that followed Samuelson [17] and used it to
study, for example, the robustness of some results that had been 
previously derived from models with real balances in the utility 
function. The device of put ting real balances into the utility 
function has been controversial since the services of money are 
not explicitly modeled in such a formulation. 
We found that, roughly speaking, perfectly anticipated 
inflations lead to welfare losses in such a model. In particular 
let 
R. = E (l/11.)
where A =  1 +a, a equals the random rate of growth of the money
supply, and E equals the mathematical expectation of the random 
variable 1/11.. Then if R0 < 1 any change that leads to an increase
in R0 leads to an increase in welfare for all generations. If 
R0 � 1 an increase in R0 leads to an increase in the welfare of
the elderly living at t = 0 but a fall in the welfare of all other 
generations. 
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These results follow from the assumption that the indifference 
curve of the young at the endowment point cuts the PPF from below 
(i.e., the marginal rate of substitution is less than one) and that 
money is the only means of transferring wealth from youth to old age. 
I t  is natural to  ask if these results are themselves robust to  
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minor alterations of the model. Clearly if a "capital" good which 
may be just inventories of consumption goods is introduced that 
pays a return greater than that on cash balances (which is negative 
in an inflation), then the demand for money may disappear now that 
this alternative, more efficient store of value has appeared, as 
no equilibrium with a positive price of money may exist. But if 
one introduces transactions costs for get ting in and out of capital, 
then the demand for money with associated positive equilibrium 
price for money is likely to reappear if such transaction costs 
are large enough, and our results on the inflation tax, for example, 
are likely to obtain. 
If the indifference curve of the young cuts the PPF from 
above at the endowment point, then there will be difficulties 
with existence of equilibrium with a positive price of money, 
since the young will want to borrow but the old will want to 
consume rather than lend. This observation leads us naturally 
to the question of whether overlapping generations models are 
a good foundation for monetary theory. 
Erecting a monetary theory on the formulation of an over­
lapping generations model with the time span of a generation 
covering some twenty-five years will strike the reader as bizarre 
indeed. We defend studying such a model because it allows us 
to gain insights into what is likely to happen in a more 
complicated model where a "generation" is one or two weeks, an 
individual lives for five to six thousand generations, and 
people carry money in order to consume in weeks where they don't 
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receive a paycheck and because it is too costly to move in and 
out of higher yielding capital goods every few weeks. 
Now in such a model for every individual that receives a 
large money endowment and a small real endowment at the 
beginning of "generation t" there must be another individual 
whose net money endowment is low and whole real endowment is 
high at the beginning of generation t, so that gains from trade 
are possible and thus the aggregate stock of money has a chance 
of being held, in equilibrium, by the economy as a whole. 
Furthermore the endowment (or wage) pattern (for each individual) 
of real goods and money must alternate in order to give individuals 
an incentive to carry money forward. Are such conditions 
satisfied well enough in the "real world" so that Gale's 
"Samuelson" case is a good abstraction? We don't know. 
It is to capture the salient features of this more complicated 
economy that the fictions of generation, small endowment at 
"old age," large endowment at "youth," and each old generation 
having an offsetting young generation were introduced. Obviously 
in the overlapping generations case it may be more realistic to 
look at the case of low endowment at youth and high endowment in 
the second period of life, which Gale [10] calls the "classical" 
case. But there is no equilibrium with positive price of money 
in the classical case unless the indifference curve of the young 
through (w ,w ) cuts the PPF from below. But this is "unlikely" y 0 . 
if w < w . There seems to be no compelling reason to reject y 0 
Gale's "classical" case just because it is inconvenient to those 
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who want to erect monetary theory on the foundations of the 
overlapping generations model (OLG). 
Wallace's raper [20] in this volume makes a spirited argument
that overlapping generations models are likely to be the best 
models of money. He argues that fiat money is intrinsically 
useless and inconvertible. Hence he argues that the continuum 
of equilibria in the OLG reflects just the "tenousness" of 
equilibrium value of an asset that is intrin9ically useless. 
But two papers by Charles Wilson [21], [22] explore a 
model that is more in the spirit of Clower in the sense that 
the equilibrium value of money ultimately derives from the 
"Clower budget constraint" that the value of an agent's current 
consumption cannot exceed the value of his money holdings at 
the beginning of the trading period. Also the Lucas [14] 
paper in this volume studies a model of this type. Wilson's 
papers show that a multitude of equilibria exist when agents are 
finite lived. Scheinkman [18] examines a generalization of 
Clawer's model with infinitely lived individuals and shows that 
a multitude of equilibria also prevail. This seems to capture 
the tenuousness that Wallace is looking for without having to go 
through such contortions as ruling out Gale's "classical" case 
or having to rule out capital goods that can be costlessly 
traded. 
How are we, as economists, to view the multitude of equi-
libria? The OLG gives no clue as to which one the economy will
converge to if any. Are we to believe that all are equally 
likely? Are we to make even money bets that a constitutional 
·· �--; 
amendment to hold the money supply constant in a constant 
population deterministic economy with zero technological change 
will lead to rampant inflation? Hardly. 
But yet to rule out such equilibria because they do not 
accord well with empirical work that supports the quantity 
theory as a long run proposition (cf. Lucas fl3] ) leaves 
unexplained the mechanism by which the economy converges to an 
equilibrium where the price level is proportional to the quantity 
of money. 
We can follow Scheinkman's [18] reasoning in this volume 
that if money is essential (in a sense that he makes precise) 
then all candidate equilibria with real balances converging to 
zero are untenable. 
But this argument won't take care of periodic equilibria. 
In long horizon models with a small rate of time preference and 
near linear utility intertemporal arbitrage will crush periodic 
equilibria. This suggests that in the "real world" the correct 
time metric for an OLG model to be a "good" model of money would 
allow it to admit "long and/or damped cycles" only. After all, 
if the cycle had a period of two weeks and a high amplitude it 
would be arbitraged down in the real world. If it had a period 
of ten years then matters are more problematic. Utility should 
display more curvature and time preference should increase as 
the time metric (relative to which such utility and time preference 
are measured) is elongated. 
What about equilibria such that real balances remain 
37 
bounded away from zero and infinity but display no recognizable 
growth pattern? Again, for reasonable preferences relative to a 
sensible time metric, the price level would not move much on a 
weekly, monthly or even possibly a yearly basis on such equilibria. 
What about movements over a decade? Here again the case is not 
so clear. 
About all we can say for sure is that the complications of 
multiple equilibria for monetarist doctrine and monetary policy 
need more'research.
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FOOTNOTES 
1. David Cass pointed out to us that if we work with real 
transfers yth directly then to each sequence of real 
transfers y1,y2, ... , in particular the stationary sequence y,
we may draw an offer curve through the point (w ,w + y ). y 0 t 
If we do this for the stationary case (w ,w + y) we may y 0 
trivially adopt COZ 's technique to depict the equilibrium 
dynamics graphically; and, hence, apply their analysis 
directly to our stationary a-equilibria. This is so because 
the young's demand (c (t),c (t + 1)) lies on the offer curve y 0 
through (w ,w + y). Equilibrium (c (t),c (t)) must satisfy y 0 y 0 
c (t) + c (t) = w + w . y 0 y 0 
In order to depict an equilibrium path graphically start at 
a point (c (O),c (0)) on the y 0 
PPF = {(c ,c )/c + c = w + w = �}.y 0 y 0 y 0 
Find a point (c (O),c (1)) on the offer curve through y 0 
(w ,w + y). Now find a point (c (l),c (1)) on the PPF. y 0 y 0 
Continue in this manner. Therefore the minor adaptation of 
the COZ analysis that was suggested above applies directly 
to the stationary a-equilibria. 
2. This result is similar to the result that the real rate of 
return on bonds may increase when the variance of the rate 
of inflation increases. In order to see the latter, let 
(a) Qt+l 
(b) pt+l 
(1 + r)Qt 
(1 + TI)P t 
describe the nominal rate of return on bonds and the 
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evolution of the price level respectively. Here r, TI are the 
nominal rate of return on bonds and the (random) rate of 
inflation respectively. Then the expected real rate of return 
on bonds in t+l give t is given by 
(c) Et{ [Qt+l/Pt+l - Qt/Pt)/(Qt/Pt)} = Et{(l + r)/(l + TI) - l} . 
Now for simplicity consider the random variable 
TI 1=: +A, probability 1/2 
= TI -A, probability 1/2 
An increase in A corresponds to an increase in the variance of 
TI about its mean TI. It is trivial to check that an increase 
in TI will increase the right-hand side of (c). Hence,. in 
this case, an increase in the variance of the rate of inflation 
will increase the real rate of return on bonds. This type of 
result is general for symmetric distribution functions. 
i 
4 1  
3 . I t  i s  fruitful t o  think o f  R - 1 as a measure o f  "distortion"
introduced by monetary policy . This is so because R = 1 is 
optimal in the sense that steady state utility and, hence, 
equilibrium utility is maximal for all generations except the 
elderly living at time 0 . 
If one asks the question as has been suggested by L. 
Hurwicz :  What monetary policy R will optimize equilibrium 
utility for all generations beginning at "T = -00 " and ending 
at "t = +oo? " Then the answer is : Put R = 1. 
The R 1 policy is attractive since a move to it from 
any policy R I 1 will help an infinitude of generations and 
harm at most the elderly that are living at time O. Out of 
all the Pareto optima R � 1 the R = 1 policy appears especially 
attractive since it maximizes capitalized steady state utility. 
4 .  It is perhaps appropriate at this point to quote from an 
Australian journalist, P. P. McGuinness, who is describing to 
his readers what he calls a "recent innovation in monetarist 
thinking," viz. " rational expectations" [ 15 ] .  
"For example, it has been suggested that attitudes to 
government deficit financing will have a major influence on 
whether it is inflationary or not. If people believe that 
the financing of the deficit must be inflationary, then they 
will act in such a way that that belief will be validated." 
Mr. McGuinness comes very close here to describing a 
situation where beliefs themselves, independent of the 
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underlying money supply process , determine the equilibrium 
path of the price level, and that is exactly the situation 
described by Theorem 3 . 2. 
5. The requirement that there exist a bounded interval that 
contains the rate of price level changes against which the 
economy is posited to retain real cash balances of at least 
E > 0 is important. Obviously no such E > 0 will exist in 
any reasonable economic model of the demand for money if the 
rate of change of the price level is unbounded. 
Let us examine the nonrandom case. 
Is pt+l/pt associated with xt + O, t + oo, A(xt) B(xt+l) 
bounded ?  
s o  that 
Now 
so that 
s Let mt 
xt+/xt 
Pt+/Pt 
t s s (1 + cr ) mo,mo > o. Then 
(1 + cr ) P/Pt+l 
(1 + cr ) (x/xt+l).
u ' (w - x )x y t t oRu ' <w0 + xt+1)xt+1 
x/ xt+l oRu ' (w0 + x  1)/u ' (w - x ) " oRu ' (w0)/u ' (w ) t+ y t y 
for xt, xt+l near zero. Hence the growth factor Pt+l/pt 
converges to the finite number 
(1 + 0) 0Ru' (w0) /u' (wy) ou' (w0) /u' (wy)
as t + 00 •  Hence the rate of growth of the price level is 
bounded along equilibria xt 
+ 0, t + 
The random case is similar. 
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